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CHAPTER 10
TOWARDS A UNIQUE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL SENTENCING
Jens David Ohlin

I.

INTRODUCTION

International criminal justice is currently faced with a crisis, one born
from a multitude of ironic and diverse sources. International justice, as
an institution, exists to bring perpetrators to justice, yet in many instances
perpetrators found guilty by competent authorities receive sentences
that one usually associates with garden-variety crimes. When compared
against sentences handed down in the United States for regular crimes,1 the
sentences of international criminal tribunals are typically far lower, even
though the crimes at these tribunals are far greater in both moral depravity
and legal significance.2 This strikes some observers as problematic, given
1

For example, the national average sentence for regular murder in the United States is around
279 months, or 23 years. See J. Gibson, ‘How Much Should Mind Ma er? Mens Rea in The
and Fraud Sentencing’, (1997) 10 Federal Sentencing Reporter 136 (citing statistics from 1994).
Over the course of 10 years the sentences have moderated, but only slightly, with the average
sentence for murder totaling 228.4 months. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sourcebook of
Federal Sentencing Statistics, Fiscal Year 2005 §3, tbl.7 (2006).
2
For example, Naser Orić received a two-year prison sentence for failing to prevent the
murder of Serb prisoners, under a theory of superior responsibility, although his conviction
was subsequently quashed. More distressingly, Prcać received a five-year sentence for torture
and other crimes in connection with the Omarska Camp cases. See Judgement, Prosecutor
v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, A. Ch., ICTY, 28 February 2005. In reviewing these
and other cases, one prosecutor at the ICTY referred to the sentences handed down by the
tribunal in general as ‘inexplicably lenient’. See M.B. Harmon and F. Gaynor, ‘Ordinary
Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes’, (2007) 5 JICJ 683, at 683. One might point, in contrast, to
the large number of defendants at the ICTY who have indeed received substantial sentences.
See, e.g., Stakić, Jelisić (40), Krstic (35), Brdjanin (30), Kunarac (28), Žigić, Kordić (25), Radić,
Naletilić, Kovač, Bralo, Dragan Nikolić, Momir Nikolić, D. Tadić (20), Šantić, Češić, Delić (18).
Also, the sentences at the ICTR have been, in comparison with the ICTY, noticeably longer.
See, e.g., Akayesu, Gacumbitsi, Kambanda, Kamuhanda, Kayishema, Muhimana, Musema,
Ndindabahizi, Niyitegeka, Rutaganda, Seromba (life), Kajelĳeli (45), Ngeze, Semanza (35),
Barayagwiza (32), Nahimana (30), Ntakirutimana, Ruzindana, Simba (25). However, it
is nonetheless true that the ICTY has not followed a similar course of handing down life
sentences and that, as of 2007, only one defendant (Galić) has received a life sentence from
the ICTY. Furthermore, other sentences at the ICTY have been much shorter: e.g. Obrenović
(17), Sikirica, Simić, Vasiljević, Zelenović, Landžo (15), Krnojelac (15 a er prosecution
appealed sentence of 7.5), Bala, Babić (13), Rajić, Josipović, Vuković (12), Plavšić (11), Deronjić,
Furundžĳa, Todorović (10), D. Jokić, Blaškić, Mucić (9), Banović, M. Tadić (8), Strugar (7.5),
M. Jokić, Aleksovski, Kvočka (7), Čerkez, Kos, Zarić (6), Došen, Erdemović, Prcać, Simić
(5), Hadžihasanović (3.5), Kolundžĳa (3), Kubura (2). The sentence of Blaškić is particularly
noteworthy since in that case the Appeals Chamber reduced the Trial Chamber’s sentence
Continued
373

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1266702

International Criminal Procedure: Towards a Coherent Body of Law

the natural intuition that the special gravity of international crimes requires
greater punishment.3 In one sense this phenomenon may simply be a
reflection of the widening gulf between American and European standards
of punishment,4 at least with regard to the ICTY, where Europeans account
for half of the judges. While the justice system of the former has increasingly
bowed to political pressures to increase penalties imposed on convicted
felons and decrease opportunities for parole, many domestic justice
systems of the la er have experimented increasingly with progressive
policies designed to rehabilitate prisoners and return them to society as
fully functioning members of the community (though European nations
themselves are not wholly immune from political pressure to increase
penalties).5 However, the problem with regard to international criminal
…of 45 years to 9 years a er a successful appeal and de novo sentencing. See Judgement
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, A. Ch., ICTY, 29 July 2004, paras. 726-29. To
understand the true importance of these statistics, it is imperative to understand the basic
methodology of comparative law. This chapter does not argue that international criminal
justice has not handed down lengthy sentences in some circumstances. Indeed, the sentences
quoted above, as well as those handed down by the Special Court for Sierra Leone – Brima
and Kanu (50), Kamara (45), Kondewa (20) – demand a more subtle thesis. Rather, I wish to
explore the comparative thesis that sentences in the United States are comparatively longer than
sentences at the international level, even for crimes such as individual cases of drug dealing,
carjacking (18 USC §2119), and murder, and include a greater willingness to hand down life
sentences, and even the death penalty, in more circumstances than in the international arena,
even in cases with only a single victim (carjacking) or, in the case of drug dealing, arguably
no ‘victims’ in the traditional sense of the term. Indeed, to explain the situation in the United
States to a European audience, it is perhaps only necessary to refer to Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 US 63 (2003), where the US Supreme Court upheld two consecutive sentences of 25 years
to life for stealing $150 worth of videotapes, under a California ‘three strikes’ statute that
provides life sentences for even pe y the if the defendant has prior felonies on his record.
As a comparative ma er, it is indisputable that this severity of punishment exists to a far less
an extent at the international level. Such comparative statements are the scholarly coin with
which legal comparativists trade. Given the vast number of crimes for which life sentences
are routinely handed down in the United States, the relatively small number of life sentences
handed down by the ICTR, as well as the few lengthy sentences handed down by the ICTY,
cannot cast doubt on this basic conclusion.
3
See, e.g., Harmon and Gaynor, ‘Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes’, supra note
2, at 711 (‘a slap on the wrist of the oﬀender is a slap in the face of the victims’).
4
For a general discussion, see the instructive study by J.Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal
Punishment and the Widening Divide between America and Europe (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2003).
5
The issue of political pressure for increased sentencing in the United States is discussed in
W.J. Stuntz, ‘The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law,’ (2001) 100 Michigan Law Review 505,
529-30 (discussing the unique dynamics of political pressure facing legislators to increase
criminal penalties). Stuntz quite astutely notes that ‘pleasing voters might mean producing
rules the voters want. But this requires that the rules be simple and understandable, the sort
of thing politicians can use in campaign speeches and advertisements. Sentencing oﬀers some
examples. Mandatory minimum sentences for drug or gun crimes and “three strikes” laws
are simple rules that voters can comprehend and politicians can use in stump speeches.’ Not
every European country has experimented with progressive penal policies, and several nations
including France and Germany flirted in the 1970s with increased punishment in response
to terrorism. See Whitman, Harsh Justice, supra note 4, at 69-71 (noting that ‘while France and
Germany have experienced nothing like the American drive toward harsher punishment for
all classes of oﬀenders … they have grown harsher only with regard to a shrinking class
Continued
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sentencing extends beyond this well-travelled dichotomy. Since the
creation of the ICTY and ICTR in 1993 and 1994, judges have been handing
down sentences for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide,
with neither a robust system of sentencing procedures nor any coherent
theoretical vision of why we are sentencing international criminals in the
first place.6 This chapter aims to remedy this oversight, by a acking the
second question first, on the assumption that only by first developing a
coherent theoretical account of international sentencing can practitioners
then hope to devise a well-cra ed system of procedure to achieve these
goals.
The chapter proceeds in three parts. First, it discusses the growing
gulf between European and American a itudes about punishment and
concludes that the dominant European models, while both well-intentioned
and successful in the domestic context, are less relevant for cases dealing
with international crimes. Second, the chapter will argue that international
criminal justice is predicated on retributive notions and that accordingly, its
sentencing policy must follow suit. Finally, it will conclude by suggesting
the necessary procedural changes, ranging from theoretical changes in how
we understand the concept of proportionality to practical suggestions such
as the creation of an international sentencing commission to guide judges
in their ad hoc sentencing determinations, as well as the creation (or return)
…of mostly violent oﬀenders’) (emphasis in original). The important point here is that European
countries such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands do not demonstrate harshness with
regard to mid-level oﬀenders in the same manner as the United States. Ibid., at 71; see also
M. Tonry and K. Hatlestad (eds.), Sentencing Reform in Overcrowding Times: A Comparative
Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) (explaining reduction in prison sentences
in Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, and other European countries);
U.V. Bondeson, Alternatives to Imprisonment: Intentions and Reality (Oxford: Westview Press,
1994) 20-21 (discussing development of conditional sentence and probation). Furthermore,
even the limited continental harshness has arguably been dwarfed by the recent US penal
responses to 9/11, including statutes that impose draconian penalties for providing material
support to terrorists. See, e.g., 18 USC §2332 (homicide of US nationals); 18 USC § 2332a (use
of weapons of mass destruction); 18 USC §2332b (acts of terrorism transcending national
boundaries); 18 USC §2332d (financial transactions with foreign state supporting terrorism);
18 USC § 2332f (bombing public locations, government facilities, public transportation
systems, and infrastructure facilities); 18 USC §2339 (harboring or concealing terrorists); 18
USC § 2339A (material support while intending to commit crimes); 18 USC §2339C (providing
funds for use in terrorism). See United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1329 n.7 (M.D.
Fl. 2004) (compiling statutory provisions).
6
Judges in many cases simply cite a litany of standard rationales for punishment, without
indicating which one is doing the real work of the argument. For example, in Tadić, the
court indicated that the factor of deterrence ‘must not be accorded undue prominence in the
overall assessment of the sentences to be imposed on persons convicted by the International
Tribunal.’ Of course, this raises the question of which factor is the real basis, because the
Appeals Chamber declined to follow this holding with a positive and complete statement
of the appropriate rationale for international punishment. See Judgement in Sentencing
Appeals, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, A. Ch., ICTY, 26 January 2000,
para. 48. See also R. Sloane, ‘Sentencing for the “Crime of Crimes”: The Evolving “Common
Law” of Sentencing of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, (2007) 5 JICJ 713, at
716 (describing sentencing at the ICTR as mere ‘a erthought’).
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of separate sentencing phases at international trials. As for methodology,
this paper assumes a connection between theory and procedure, in the
sense that the proper procedural mechanics for sentencing may only
be finalised once we have developed a coherent theory underlying the
punishment of international criminals.7 These are the most paramount
issues that international criminal justice faces and cannot be swept aside
simply because the political and diplomatic obstacles to sentencing reform
are too high.
II.

GULF BETWEEN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN ATTITUDES
ABOUT PUNISHMENT

As has been amply explored by comparative legal scholars such as James
Q. Whitman, a itudes about criminal punishment diﬀer quite sharply
between the American and European continents. This disagreement can
be seen in the theoretical posture toward punishment in the United States,
including a more prominent place for retributive and expressivist concerns,
longer prison sentences, harsh treatment while in prison, and capital
punishment in extreme cases.8 By contrast, most Western European penal
systems demonstrate a greater concern for rehabilitation, shorter prison
terms,9 dignified treatment in prison, and a near-total abolition of capital
punishment, even for extreme crimes.10 I will address each briefly.
First, consider the diﬀerences in sentencing theories. Most European penal
systems are built around a commitment to rehabilitating prisoners and
returning them to productive society.11 Such systems are o en evaluated
7

The argument for this methodological assumption is that criminal procedure seeks to
maximise certain values and goals (e.g. human rights norms, truth-seeking, fairness, etc.),
and that one chooses the procedure best suited to achieve those goals. One cannot design
the procedural framework without first laying the theoretical foundation.
8
Again, the proposition here is comparative in nature. Factors above and beyond retributive
theories contribute to the situation in the United States, including the aforementioned political
pressure. See supra note 5 and related text.
9
See A. Freiberg, ‘What’s It Worth? A Cross-Jurisdictional Comparison of Sentence Severity,’
in C. Tata and N. Hu on (eds.), Sentencing and Society: International Perspectives (Aldershot:
Ashgate Publishing, 2002), at 237-8 (review of statistical literature showing that US and
Russia imprison the most, Japan and Scandinavia the least). Also, Whitman notes at 72 that
the man who stabbed Monica Seles received probation for his violent crime ‘[f]ollowing
normal German practice’.
10
There is ample evidence that many European jurisdictions place greater weight on such
ma ers and are moving in a contrary direction to the United States. See, e.g., Whitman, Harsh
Justice, supra note 4, at 74-5 (discussing the ‘widening divide in Western punishment’ and
concluding that ‘[t]he result is undoubtedly that the situation in the prisons of Europe has
go en much be er than the situation in the prisons of America’); C. Pfeiﬀer, ‘Alternative
Sanctions in Germany: An Overview of Germany’s Sentencing Practices’, National Criminal
Justice Reference Service (February 1996).
11
See Whitman, Harsh Justice, supra note 4, at 73 (noting that in Germany, ‘individualization,
oriented toward treatment and resocialization, remains unchallenged orthodox doctrine in the
practice of punishment, even if academics occasionally raise doubts about it’); K.S. Sharples,
The Legal Framework of Judicial Sentencing Policy: A Study Based on the Dutch and English Systems
(Amsterdam, University Press, 1972) 170.
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by the degree to which they lower recidivism rates.12 Prisoners also
receive incredible access to educational and vocational programs, as well
as healthcare (including mental health), so that they emerge from their
sentences in good condition. But this is more than just a commitment to
humane treatment.13 It also implicates one of the leading moral justifications
for the institution of punishment. If punishment is justified primarily
because it rehabilitates prisoners and, in so doing, promotes social utility,
then penal institutions must be organised to maximise these goals.14
By contrast, American penal institutions are, comparatively speaking,
increasingly justified by either deterrence or retribution.15 Although a
fierce moral and theoretical debate rages between these two schools of
thought, what unites them is a political commitment, in the US at least, that
prison sentences should not only be long but, in the paraphrased words
of Hobbes, produce a life in prison that is ‘nasty, brutish, and short’.16
For retributivists, prison sentences for severe crimes need to be long to
capture the moral depravity of these acts adequately, consistent with
Kantian and deontological inspirations.17 For deterrence theorists, prison
sentences need to be adequately long to deter other potential criminals
from engaging in future crimes. This also counsels against making prisons
comfortable. The very point of establishing such institutions is to paint a
suﬃciently grave picture so as to incentivise others to comply with the
12

However, it is important not to overstate the degree of uniformity among Continental or
European a itudes. Indeed, scholars have advanced retributivist arguments and policies
in Germany and elsewhere, while a thriving debate about deterrence policies exists in the
United States. For example, a recent wave of scholarship has considered the deterrent eﬀect
of capital punishment. Compare C.R. Sunstein and A. Vermeule, ‘Is Capital Punishment
Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoﬀs’, (2005) 58 Stanford Law Review
703, 711 (finding ‘substantial deterrent eﬀect’) with J.J. Donohue and J. Wolfers, ‘Uses and
Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate’, (2005) 58 Stanford Law Review
791, 794 (‘existing evidence for deterrence is surprisingly fragile’). See also M.L. Radelet and
R.L. Akers, ‘Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views of the Experts’, (1996) 87 Journal
of Criminal Law & Criminology 1, at 10 (‘wide consensus among America’s top criminologists
that scholarly research has demonstrated that the death penalty does, and can do, li le to
reduce rates of criminal violence’).
13
See, e.g., T. Lappi-Seppälä, ‘Sentencing and Punishment in Finland: The Decline of the
Repressive Ideal’, in M. Tonry and R.S. Frase (eds.), Sentencing and Sanctions in Western
Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 92 (‘During the late 1960s, not only did
flaws in the treatment ideology become more evident but demands for more adequate and
less repressive criminal law grew louder’).
14
See Whitman, Harsh Justice, supra note 4, at 73.
15
See, e.g., P.L. Griset, Determinate Sentencing: The Promise and the Reality of Retributive Justice
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1991).
16
Constitutional litigation over prison conditions is limited by the standard set by the Supreme
Court in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 US 294 (1991), which requires that inmates prove deliberate
indiﬀerence on the part of prison oﬃcials in order to succeed in an Eighth Amendment claim.
Consequently, such claims are rarely successful.
17
See Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law, translated by W. Hastie (1887); M.S. Moore, ‘The
Moral Worth of Retribution’ in F. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character and the Emotions:
New Essays in Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) (though noting
that retributivists need not adhere to the principle of lex talionis). See also M.S. Moore, Placing
Blame: A General Theory of Criminal Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
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demands of the law.18 Although conditions might be restricted by basic
standards of non-brutality as evidenced by human rights law standards,
they must retain their unpleasant character for the institution to fulfill its
basic consequentialist goal of deterrence.19
Second, there is a wide disparity in the length of prison sentences between
the United States and Europe.20 In addition to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines which establish guidelines – once mandatory, now advisory21 –
for federal crimes, each state has its own sentencing practices. What unites
all of them, however, is the assumption that violent crimes– rape, murder,
etc. – deserve lengthy prison terms, including life in prison for the worst
oﬀenders. By contrast, most European jurisdictions hand down prison
sentences that are comparatively shorter.22 To name just one example, a
Spanish court handed down sentences for 21 out of 28 suspects charged in
the Madrid train bombings.23 Many of the prison sentences were between
10 and 15 years – sentences that would shock many US observers as being
absurdly low considering the severity of the crime in question (a terrorist
a ack that killed 191 individuals).24 Indeed, some European jurisdictions
have even abolished, by statute, life sentences.25
18
Although criminal law theory is usually not couched in such economic terms, some
theorists are pushing it in this direction. See G. Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach’, (1968) 76 Journal of Political Economy 169. For more recent expressions, see N.
Kumar Katyal, ‘Conspiracy Theory’, (2003) 112 Yale Law Journal 1307, 1315; R.A. Posner,
‘An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law’, (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review 1193 (deriving
basic criminal prohibitions from the concept of eﬃciency); M. Osiel, ‘The Banality of Good:
Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity’, (2005) 105 Columbia Law Review 1751 (discussing
‘whether an economic vantage point and cast of mind might shed some light on improving
the law’s response to such horrific events’). Although I do not share Osiel’s inclination to
view and analyse atrocity through the lens of economic incentives, Osiel’s contribution is
nonetheless significant because he recognises the need for a unique theory of punishment
for international crimes, and correctly notes that criminologists have ignored this question.
See ibid., at 1755.
19
See Posner, ‘An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law’, supra note 18, at 1208 (noting that
imprisonment is important as a tool for criminals ‘who cannot be made miserable enough
by having their liquid wealth, or even their future wealth, confiscated’).
20
See Whitman, Harsh Justice, supra note 4, at 56; see also T. Weigend, ‘Sentencing in West
Germany’, in M. Tonry and F.E. Zimring (eds.), Reform and Punishment: Essays on Criminal
Sentencing (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1983) 23 (‘Sentencing inequality
in the United States can mean the diﬀerence between twenty years in prison and three
years… Critics of arbitrary sentencing in Germany, by contrast, compare fi y-day fines…
with thirty-day fines’).
21
See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005).
22
See T. Weigend, ‘Sentencing in West Germany’, supra note 20, at 23 (‘The high incident of
dangerous crime may thus lead to a siege mentality on the part of American legislatures and
judges which is absent from German legal thinking and practice’).
23
On 18 July 2008, a Spanish court reversed convictions for four of the defendants.
24
The self-proclaimed mastermind of the plot, Rabei Osman Sayed Ahmed, was convicted
in Italy and sentenced to 10 years in prison. He faced terrorism charges in Spain and was
acqui ed.
25
For example, the maximum penalty in Norway is 21 years and the maximum penalty in
Spain is 40 years.
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Third, European and American prisons diﬀer with regard to the treatment
that inmates receive while in prison. As already stated above, American
prisons allow access to vocational and educational programs, but not
nearly to the same degree as most Western European countries.26 More
importantly, however, European prisons are more commi ed to recognising
the dignity of prisoners by treating them with respect.27 American prisoners
are constantly subjected to humiliating and degraded experiences, whether
by prison guards or other inmates.28 Such degradations also motivate public
shaming rituals and punishments, designed to degrade the criminal by
publicising both his crime and his punishment.29 Sexual oﬀenders who
are released from prison have their names and pictures published in
newspapers or posted on telephone poles.30
Finally, to state the obvious, Americans and Europeans have widely
diﬀering a itudes about the death penalty. While many jurisdictions in
the United States retain the death penalty, every member of the European
Union has abolished it.31 At first, the abolitionist movement in Europe
excluded extreme cases in wartime or emergencies, but now the abolition
is total, even in cases dealing with mass murder and terrorism.32 Also,
26

These are generalities. For example, Whitman notes that prison conditions in France are,
in some cases, deplorable. See Whitman, Harsh Justice, supra note 4, at 76.
27
In Europe, the dignity of prisoners is considered to be a requirement of international
law imposed by the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. However, no analogous legal dialogue exists in the United States,
in part because the US ratification of the convention came with an express reservation that its
treaty commitment with regard to criminal punishment would not extend beyond the limits
imposed by the Eighth Amendment. The issue and its relevance is discussed in Whitman,
Harsh Justice, supra note 4, at 60.
28
See Whitman, Harsh Justice, supra note 4, at 60 (‘Prison conditions are thus in some ways not
as bad in the United States as one might think. Nevertheless, they certainly are bad, especially
by contrast with Germany.’). Certainly such conditions also exist in European prisons, and
homosexual rape is also a problem in both France and Germany. As a comparative proposition,
though, it is still true that prison conditions in the United States are worse than in Europe,
and there is less public pressure in the United States than in western European countries to
improve them. This point is especially important for international criminal justice, since no
defendants convicted at the ICTY or ICTR are currently serving their sentences in the United
States, while many are serving sentences in European prisons.
29
Shaming penalties are gaining in popularity in the United States, especially in the area of
sex crimes. Also notable is their use for non-violent oﬀences, such as failure to pay child
support.
30
M. Woolhouse, ‘Can bans protect kids from a ack?’, The Boston Globe, 16 July 2006 (describing
campaign by local residents to force convicted sex oﬀender out of neighbourhood by, inter
alia, posting his picture on telephone poles).
31
For a comprehensive survey, see the leading book on the subject by W.A. Schabas, The
Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law (3rd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002).
32
The death penalty was restricted by the Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 15
December 1989, 1642 UNTS 414 (hereina er, Second Optional Protocol), which allows
reservations pursuant to Article 2 that explicitly contemplates reservations for use of the death
penalty ‘in time of war pursuant to a conviction for a most serious crime of a military
Continued
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the abolition movement in the United States is largely organised around
constitutional arguments that the practice violates either the Due Process
Clause33 or the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,34 while the
abolition movement in Europe makes reference to evolving standards of
international law.35 However, American courts are usually hostile, with
a few notable exceptions, to the idea that evolving standards of human
rights as embodied in international law can constrain American judicial
sovereignty in any meaningful way.36
This split has had a huge eﬀect on international criminal justice, though
the split has gone unnoticed by most scholars working in the field.37
First, international criminal justice is dominated by Europeans, both at
the institutional level and at the individual level.38 The major institutions
are Hague-centric or placed in other corners of the world. Indeed, even
the upcoming trial of Charles Taylor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone
will be convened in The Hague.39 While the ICTR of course is convened
…nature commi ed during wartime’. However, the Thirteenth Protocol of the European
Convention on Human Rights calls for abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances. For
an analysis of this evolution, compare J.D. Ohlin, ‘Applying the Death Penalty for Crimes of
Genocide’, (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 747, with W.A. Schabas, ‘War Crimes,
Crimes Against Humanity and the Death Penalty’, (1997) 60 Albany Law Review 733.
33
See, e.g., United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (SDNY 2002) (opinion by Judge Rakoﬀ
holding that death penalty violates due process clause), rev’d, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002).
34
See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US 304 (2002) (execution of mentally retarded is cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
35
See particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Conviction on
Human Rights, and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.
36
The notable exception is Justice Kennedy, who wrote in Roper v. Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005),
that ‘[o]ur determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for oﬀenders
under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in
the world that continues to give oﬃcial sanction to the juvenile death penalty.’ However, even
in Justice Kennedy’s formulation, the standards imposed by international law were merely
illustrative, but not constraining: ‘This reality does not become controlling, for the task of
interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility.’ Ibid., at 575.
37
I took great pains to point out the problems with abolition with regard to crimes against
genocide, though the issue remains largely unaddressed. See generally Ohlin, ‘Applying the
Death Penalty for Crimes of Genocide’, supra note 32.
38
While it is true that some prominent US lawyers have served in significant positions at
the ICTY and ICTR, as a comparative ma er their contributions have been eclipsed by their
European colleagues. Furthermore, the relationship is dialectical, because international
criminal law currently occupies a comparatively marginal presence in US legal culture,
compared with most European legal cultures that place great weight on the legal status
of international criminal law. Indeed, US lawyers in some circles still adhere to the notion
that neither public international law nor international criminal law is real ‘law’. See, e.g.,
International Law: Norms, Actors, Process (New York: Aspen/Kluwer, 2006) 983 and passim
(standard US casebook discussing ‘ontological’ question of whether international law is real
law). Such a view would not be seriously entertained on the law faculty of a leading law
school in, say, the Netherlands.
39
Several scholars have discussed the inherent limitations by taking justice out of the hands
of local oﬃcials and placing it within the discretion of the international community. See J.E.
Alvarez, ‘Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda’, (1999) 24 Yale Journal of
International Law 365, at 408. That being said, the Charles Taylor trial in The Hague
Continued
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in Tanzania, the point is simply that the institutions are not based in the
United States.40 At the individual level, the vast majority of lawyers at the
ad hoc and permanent tribunals are non-American, a surprising reality
when one remembers that many of the key legal figures at Nuremberg
– the beginning of ICL– were Americans.41 Furthermore, the number
of European scholars working in ICL far outnumbers the relatively few
Americans who are working in the field.42 Of course, one might note that
the institutions and individuals are all European because the United States
has recently declined to participate in the project of international criminal
justice in a meaningful way.43 In addition to the usual concerns about
sovereignty that influenced US policy regarding the ICC, an international
tribunal was not even considered by the United States or Iraq for Saddam
Hussein, nor did the US even consider international trials for captured al
Qaeda terrorists.44
…was necessitated by the fact that there was no adequate domestic judicial system in place
to conduct such a trial of political importance, and a trial in the region would have risked
regional disorder. See UN Security Council Resolution 1688 (‘the continued presence of
former President Taylor in the subregion is an impediment to stability and a threat to the
peace of Liberia and of Sierra Leone and to international peace and security in the region’).
In many instances, what is lost by removing the judicial process from the community where
the atrocities occurred is more than outweighed by the gains from conducting a trial in a
non-biased and legally sophisticated forum. Nonetheless, scholars need to be more a entive
to the fact that these transfers to international jurisdiction frequently involve the imposition
of new sentencing criteria that are widely out of step with local standards.
40
Although this fact may change some day in the future, the lack of an international tribunal
in the United States is symptomatic of the continuing American scepticism with participation
in international legal institutions. See S.B. Sewall and C. Kaysen (eds.), The United States
and the International Criminal Court: National Security and International Law (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Li lefield, 2000).
41
Any list would have to include Robert Jackson (IMT prosecutor), Telford Taylor (prosecutor
at the US Military Tribunals si ing at Nuremberg), Francis Biddle (IMT judge), and Murray
Bernays (military judge responsible for conspiracy and criminal organisation strategies). For
a discussion of the relevant personalities, see T. Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials:
A Personal Memoir (New York, Knopf, 1992). Jurists from France and the Soviet Union also
made significant contributions, though the legal structure of the proceedings (including
criminalising aggression) can be directly traced to Americans, such as Bernays and Henry
Stimson, in the War Department. See P. Maguire, Law and War: An American Story (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2001) 94-5.
42
The major journals in the field are all based in Europe, including the Journal of International
Criminal Justice (edited in Florence, published in Oxford) and the International Criminal
Law Review (Leiden). No specialised ICL journals currently exist in the United States. Most
importantly, the number of US scholars working in international criminal law (as opposed
to human rights law), given the large size of today’s US legal academia, is very small when
compared with law faculties in, for example, the Netherlands. This may change in the
future.
43
A er initially signing the Rome Statute under the Clinton administration, the United
States not only declined to ratify the treaty, but also ‘unsigned’ the treaty in the opening
days of the Bush Administration. See N. Green, ‘Stonewalling Justice,’ (2004) 26 Harvard
International Review 34.
44
For a discussion of this issue, see Ohlin, ‘Applying the Death Penalty for Crimes of Genocide’,
supra note 32, at 749.
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I wish to argue here that the current situation is disastrous for two reasons.
First, judges at the ad hoc tribunals engage in sentencing decisions with li le
regard to a coherent vision underlying the incarceration of international
criminals, leading in turn to inconsistent sentences.45 Furthermore, this
lack of a coherent vision, one that is truly transnational and transregional,
has led to a failure to adopt robust criminal procedures for dealing with
international criminal sentences. Finally, and most importantly, the current
situation has led to the over-influence of domestic standards of sentencing
at the international tribunals, especially at the ICTY, resulting in sentences
that may fail to reflect the moral and legal gravity of the oﬀences involved.46
This argument will be defended in the following sections of this chapter
by arguing that many of the central rationales that justify sentences at
the domestic level– primarily consequentialist– do not apply with equal
force at the international level. International criminal law therefore
requires a sui generis sentencing rationale. If one accepts this argument,
the problem must be regarded as essential for achieving ICL’s stated goal
of ending impunity.47 The solution will be presented in the final section
of this chapter: comprehensive procedural reform of international criminal
sentencing. By reforming post-trial sentencing procedures through the
creation of a sentencing commission, detailed but optional guidelines,
and a distinct sentencing phase, judges will be encouraged to develop this
under-theorised area of ICL into a coherent body of law.
III.

S TA N DA R D V I E W S O F P U N I S H M E N T FA I L I N
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Having established that international criminal justice lacks a sui generis
sentencing regime and instead relies on importation of domestic sentencing
theories only partially relevant for international crimes, we must now
explore the central thesis of this chapter: that these institutions are
inappropriate for a system of international criminal justice.
Before proceeding, it should be absolutely clear that this paper does not
seek to dislodge the privileged place that progressive sentencing theories
have within some European domestic criminal law systems. I am willing at
the moment to concede, for the sake of argument, that European models of
45
See Osiel, ‘The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity’, supra note
18, at 1821; Sloane, ‘Sentencing for the “Crime of Crimes”‘, supra note 6, at 716; Harmon and
Gaynor, ‘Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes’, supra note 2, at 683.
46
See Harmon and Gaynor, ‘Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes’, supra note 2, at
683-6. However, Harmon and Gaynor do not explicitly recognise this factor as a source of
the problem.
47
Impunity is explicitly mentioned in the Rome Statute preamble, in which the State
Parties express their determination ‘to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these
crimes’. Although a treaty preamble is not meant to create a legal duty or responsibility, it
is nonetheless emblematic of the international a itude that functions as a foundation for
international criminal justice. As far as I am aware, no scholar has explicitly connected the
failure to create an adequate sentencing regime with the notion of impunity.
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rehabilitation, reeducation and dignified treatment of prisoners are more
appropriate than competing models, at least within the context of domestic
criminal law. The argument here is confined to the specific circumstances
of international criminal justice. Essentially, although these institutions
and practices work in the domestic context, they are inappropriate for
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and it is
especially unfortunate that domestic penal practices have been imported
without consideration of their suitability to international criminal justice.
I would submit that international criminal law would do be er to look to
the standard institutions of jus in bello – the law of war – than domestic
criminal law.48
Consider first our commitment to reeducation and rehabilitation. In
the domestic context, it may make sense to oﬀer services for the prison
population that needs to be reintroduced into society. The idea here is to
reform the criminal – both his habits and his mindset – and to rid him of
criminal tendencies.49 Many of these notions have now been enshrined
both in penal policy as well as basic human rights standards.50 In the
international context, however, one must ask whether it makes sense to
a empt rehabilitation in cases of genocide and crimes against humanity.51
For individuals who believe that members of an ethnic group are ‘sub48

The appropriate judicial precedent for the law of war is the system of military justice that
dominates in most Western democracies. Far from being judicially naïve, such military
institutions have a reputation for demonstrating remarkable fidelity to basic principles of
criminal law and procedural protections, even if punishments are occasionally harsh. For an
example, see the US Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 801 et seq. It is important
to distinguish between the harsh punishments meted down by courts martial, on the one
hand, and the kind of rough ba lefield justice advocated by Churchill, who suggested quick
ba lefield trials for members of the Nazi General Staﬀ, followed by summary execution. The
appropriate balance is the one achieved at Nuremberg – severe punishments a er rigorous
trials conducted according to the rule of law. This sentiment is embodied in the famous phrase
from Justice Jackson: ‘That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury
stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment
of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.’ For a
discussion, see generally G. Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice
(New York: The New Press, 2003).
49
This idea implicates a medical model of punishment, one amply explored in Michel
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 1978).
50
The most telling example of applying basic principles of human rights to the penal process
is the Soering case that held that the so-called death row phenomenon – languishing in prison
while awaiting execution as the appeals process winds down – is an inhuman and degrading
punishment in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. See Judgement,
Soering v. UK, Application no. 14038/88, 7 July 1989, para. 105.
51
Part of the importation may be explained by the nexus between human rights law and
international criminal law. The former concentrates on rehabilitation as an appropriate goal
for penal sanctions. See, e.g., Article 10 (3) of the ICCPR: ‘The penitentiary system shall
comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and
social rehabilitation.’ For an example, see Judgement, Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No.
IT-01-47-T, T. Ch., T. Ch. II, ICTY, 15 March 2006, para. 2080 (‘The Chamber also finds that
the Accused Hadžihasanović has a character which can be rehabilitated and that he thus
merits a reduced sentence’).
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human’ and ought to be ‘destroyed in whole or in part,’ through eradication,
mass murder and rape, or expulsion from a territory, such mindsets are not
susceptible to reform through programs of ‘reeducation.’52 This problem is
exacerbated by the fact that international criminal justice focuses, for the
most part, on major organisers of genocide and crimes against humanity, as
opposed to street level participants.53 Could Hitler, Himmler or Eichmann
have been reformed of their genocidal commitments while in prison to such
an extent that they could be rehabilitated and returned to productive use in
society?54 To the contrary, our experience with genocidal Nazi war criminals
suggests that those who serve prison sentences for genocide spend the rest
of their lives as apologists for the genocidal regimes they served.55
Second, the policy goal of deterrence is equally problematic in cases of
international criminal justice.56 While criminals in the domestic context
52

For examples, one need only consult the trial of Milošević, who appeared u erly unfazed
by his time in incarceration and used his trial to further publicise his Weltanschauung. For
an innovative description of the trial, see M. Steinitz, ‘The Milosevic Trial – Live! An Iconical
Analysis of International Law’s Claim of Legitimate Authority,’ (2005) 3 JICJ 103-23 (discussing
the symbolism of the interpersonal dynamics of the trial).
53
This argument is not based on the idea that all such criminals are inherently similar. Rather,
the argument is based on the inherent similarity of genocide and the other core international
crimes, as compared with domestic crimes. It must be conceded that lower-level defendants
who engage in war crimes because they are simply following orders or fear for their lives,
e.g. Erdemović, may be legitimately reeducated and reintroduced to society. See also C.R.
Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Ba alion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New
York: Harper, 1992). But it is unclear if the same holds true for organisers of a joint criminal
enterprise to commit genocide, whose criminal actions are not motivated by a desire to follow
military orders but rather a desire to achieve a genocidal outcome based on the belief, as
a ma er of science, that another ethnic group is inherently sub-human. Such a itudes are
usually so closely held that they are not subject to revision. Cf. E. Staub, The Roots of Evil: The
Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992)
76 (discussing the fanatic as perpetrator).
54
See M. Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass
Atrocity’, (2005) 99 Northwestern University Law Review 539, at 590 (deterrence based on
unproven assumption of perpetrator rationality in the chaos of massive violence). Drumbl
correctly argues that domestic criminal law theories regarding sentencing are irrelevant for
international criminal law.
55
Indeed, Hitler’s time in prison a er the Beer Hall Putsch did not deter him from engaging
in future acts of violence and historical evidence suggests that it had the reverse eﬀect: it
radicalised him, inspired him to write Mein Kampf, and laid the seeds for his eventual rise
to power. However, not every case study is as black and white as this. Some might wish to
point to the story of Erdemović, who demonstrated apparently sincere remorse a er his
appearance before the ICTY on charges of crimes against humanity for shooting civilians
in a massacre. It is important to note, however, that Erdemović’s remorse began before his
trial – he commi ed the killings only a er his life and that of his family was threatened
by his commanding oﬃcer – and that his remorse was not generated by his time in prison
and was already in evidence before his trial was even concluded and certainly before his
sentence began. For a discussion of the Erdemović case, see A. Fichtelberg, ‘Liberal Values in
International Criminal Law: A Critique of Erdemović,’ (2008) 6 JICJ 3-19.
56
Ralph Henham asserts that current international criminal sentencing practice is built
primarily around retributivism. See his ‘Developing Contextualized Rationales for Sentencing
in International Criminal Trials: A Plea for Empirical Research’, (2007) 5 JICJ 757-78, at
Continued
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may or may not be motivated by fear of punishment – the empirical
point is still hotly debated57 – war criminals are even less susceptible to
the usual inducements.58 Those who kill and rape civilians are motivated
by a variety of factors – genocidal hatred, war-induced rage, etc. – and
…757. However, it is unclear what the basis is for this sweeping assumption. Although
Henham cites Aleksovski, the Appeals Chamber in that case responded to a Prosecutor’s
oﬃce submission arguing that the central aim of international sentencing was to deter future
crimes. Instead of rejecting this assertion, the ICTY Appeals Chamber simply indicated
that retribution was an ‘equally important factor’ and cited the need to make ‘plain the
condemnation of the international community of the behavior in question‘. See Judgement,
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, A. Ch., ICTY, 24 March 2000, para. 185
(increasing Trial Chamber sentence of two and a half years to seven years minus time already
served). However, the subsequent sentences of the ICTY Appeal Chamber, see supra note 2
and related text, call into question whether these sentences are anything more than empty
rhetoric. Furthermore, other trial chambers have specifically rejected retributivism as a basis
for international sentencing. See Judgement, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, T. Ch. I,
ICTY, 3 March 2000, para. 761, where the Trial Chamber specifically prioritised deterrence
as the leading basis for sentencing. This line of reasoning also follows Judgement, Prosecutor
v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21, T. Ch. II, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 1234, noting that
deterrence is ‘probably the most important factor in the assessment of appropriate sentences
for violations of international humanitarian law.’ The Chamber even argued that ‘the accused
should be suﬃciently deterred by appropriate sentence from ever contemplating taking part
in such crimes again, persons in similar situations in the future should similarly be deterred
from resorting to such crimes.’ It seems implausible to think that future war criminals will
be deterred by sentences from an international court, given the nature of these conflicts and
the fact that war criminals are usually motivated by extreme versions of genocidal hatred,
racial animus, or war-like aggression. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber in Čelebići rejected
retributivism in the strongest possible language, noting that ‘[t]he theory of retribution, which
is an inheritance of the primitive theory of revenge, urges the Trial Chamber to retaliate to
appease the victim’ and concluding that ‘[r]etributive punishment by itself does not bring
justice.’ See ibid., at para. 1231. The Trial Chamber argued that retributivism by itself was
inconsistent with the reconciliatory aspirations of the Security Council to restore peace and
security in the region, and then spoke positively about protection of society, rehabilitation,
and deterrence. Other trial chambers have treated retributivism as just one among many
competing rationales. See Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, T.
Ch., ICTY, 14 July 1997, para. 61 (‘Further, while the purpose of criminal law sanctions include
such aims as just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation of the dangerous and rehabilitation,
the Trial Chamber accepts that the “modern philosophy of penology [is] that the punishment
should fit the oﬀender and not merely the crime.”‘); Judgement, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al.,
Case No. IT-96-21, A. Ch., ICTY, 20 February 2001, para. 806 (concluding that deterrent and
retributive goals should be more important than rehabilitation and specifically rejecting
Article 10 (3) ICCPR and Article 5 (6) of the American Convention on Human Rights.). For
a discussion, see also W.A. Schabas, ‘Penalties,’ in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 151718 (noting also that the Appeals Chamber a ached some weight to retributive concerns in
Aleksovski and Čelebići).
57
The issue is most o en researched within the context of the death penalty. See Sunstein
and Vermeule, ‘Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?’, supra note 12, at 711; Donohue
and Wolfers, ‘Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?’, supra note 12, at 794; Radelet and
Akers, ‘Deterrence and the Death Penalty’, supra note 12, at 10. For a discussion of the issue
within criminal law generally, see P.H. Robinson and J.M. Darley, ‘The Role of Deterrence
in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best’, (2003) 91
Georgetown Law Journal 949, at 953.
58
The problems associated with deterrence are explored by David Wippman in his article
‘Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice’, (1999) 23 Fordham International
Law Journal 473.
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most of these are not the types of motivations that can be altered by the
knowledge that, possibly, just possibly, one might face criminal liability at
an ad hoc or permanent international tribunal.59 Indeed, war criminals are
uniquely willing to engage in their conduct regardless of the personal cost,
because, as combatants, they face death every day.60 Against the backdrop
of a violent death in a military conflict, the possibility of a prison term is
nothing significant.61 (Those who occupy command positions in either
the military or civilian leadership – who are removed from daily military
danger – are o en fuelled by feelings of megalomania and again are
sometimes insensitive to rational inducements.) Also, prisoners convicted
at the ICTY are o en housed in prisons in countries such as Norway and
Sweden, where prison conditions are excellent, including televisions and
access to places of religious worship for engaging in quiet reflection.62
If anything, such conditions would be a welcome change from military
service – not something to be feared.
As a final point, consider also an expressivist theory of punishment.63 It
is possible that international criminal punishment might be legitimately
justified on these grounds.64 Perhaps the whole point of such sentences
is to express society’s condemnation of such horrendous activity. In this
59
Indeed, even though Erdemović and those in analogous situations (e.g. duress) were not
motivated by genocidal hatred, they too would not be aﬀected by indirect or direct deterrence,
since the duress applied against them functioned to outweigh all other competing factors.
60
Granted, not all war criminals are members of the military or paramilitary. Some defendants
are politicians (e.g. Stakić, Milosević, Karadžić, etc.), while others are members of the private
sector (Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze were media executives). Even within this civilian
group, though, many (such as Stakić) are personally engaged in the military campaign in
some fashion. See, e.g. Judgement, Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, T. Ch. II, ICTY,
31 July 2003, para. 368 (noting that cooperation with military authorities was so close that
Stakić eventually wore a military uniform and carried a weapon, even though he was a
civilian politician).
61
Payam Akhavan argues that a deterrence model for international criminal justice can work
by instilling respect for the rule of law, though it is unclear how this happens given that
genocidal criminals act outside the boundaries of civilised conduct. See his ‘Justice in the
Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia?’, (1999) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 737, at 744. Noted
jurist Theodor Meron also apparently believes that war criminals can be deterred through
expansion of war crimes prosecutions. See T. Meron, ‘From Nuremberg to the Hague,’ (1995)
149 Military Law Review 107.
62
Defendants convicted at the ICTR – apart from those that still remain in the UN Detention
Facility in Arusha (Tanzania) – are currently housed in prisons in Mali and Italy which
replicate the standard prison conditions for domestic crimes in these countries. Benin,
Swaziland, France, Sweden and, more recently, Rwanda, have also signed a cooperation
agreement with the ICTR to house convicted defendants, but have not yet received any.
63
On the relationship between retributivism and expressivism, see H.L.A. Hart, Punishment
and Responsibility (New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968) 234-35. See also
J. Feinberg, ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment,’ in J. Feinberg, Doing and Deserving:
Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). Cf. A. von
Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 9.
64
See Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence and Individual Punishment’, supra note 54, at 592 (noting
that international criminal law expresses the primary of international law itself).
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case, ‘society’ is the international community.65 However, if this is the
case, then clearly we want to express that genocide and crimes against
humanity are far greater crimes than single cases of murder. They are moral
catastrophes deserving of the highest condemnation we can muster. If that
is the underlying background of the sentencing philosophy of international
criminal justice,66 the sentencing schemes should be much higher than
those available in the domestic context.67 Unfortunately, however, cases
of complicity in crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes, have
o en yielded sentences (at least at the ICTY) that may not adequately
express the world community’s outrage over the moral indignities that
the victims suﬀered.68
This is especially problematic given that the central stated goal of
international criminal justice, as expressed in the Rome Statute, is to end
impunity for international crimes. However, when someone is complicit
in genocidal acts, of conspiring to murder or participating in the murder
of thousands of individuals, and then spends only 10 or 20 years in a
comfortable prison watching cable television and engaging in pleasant
recreational activities, then we must ask ourselves some serious questions
about whether, in some sense, genocidal criminals are ge ing away with
murder.69 This is precisely the danger when sentences are too short and
served in comfortable surroundings.
Given that none of these models are appropriate for international criminal
justice, it is striking that producing a general theory of international
sentencing is not higher on the agenda for international judges and
scholars.70 The only remaining model – retributivism – is the least popular,
65

This may be especially important in cases of genocide, where the international law trial both
establishes a historical record and also expresses the international community’s judgement
that the facts constitute genocide. See ibid., at 593. See also Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor
v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-S, T. Ch., ICTY, 13 November 2001, para. 149 (discussing the
truth-finding function as a fundamental objective of international tribunals).
66
See R.D. Sloane, ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the
National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law,’ (2007) 43 Stanford
Journal of International Law 39.
67
See, e.g., von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions, supra note 63, at 15.
68
See Harmon and Gaynor, ‘Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes’, supra note 2, at
683-6 (noting inadequacy of ICTY punishments); see also Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence and
Individual Punishment’, supra note 54, at 565 (discussing sentences generally for international
and national crimes).
69
One well-publicised case involves the sentence of Biljana Plavšić, the Bosnian Serb president,
who served her prison sentence in a comfortable Swedish prison complete with recreational
activities, including horseback riding, a massage room, and saunas. See Sentencing Judgement,
Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39, T. Ch., ICTY, 27 February 2003 (eleven-year sentence
for crimes against humanity). Prosecutors dropped a genocide charge against Plavšić a er
she agreed to plead guilty to persecution as a crime against humanity. For a discussion of
the case and the sentencing controversy, see N.A. Combs, ‘International Decisions’, (2003) 97
American Journal of International Law 929, at 935; P. McLoughlin, ‘Serb War Criminal Plavsic
Goes to Swedish Jail’, Reuters News Service, 27 June 2003.
70
A few scholars have adequately noted the urgency of the problem, though it is unclear
Continued
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both in the United States and in Europe.71 But as we shall see in the
following section, it is retributivism that most closely tracks the policy
goal of international criminal justice and the unique factors present in the
law of war. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated in the final section, the
relative paucity of judicial development in this crucial area stems from the
lacuna of procedural mechanics in the (now non-existent) sentencing phase
when compared with the judicial development of substantive international
criminal law and the rich and detailed procedures of the guilt phase.
IV.

THE RETRIBUTIVE MODEL

Retributivism is built around the central premise that the guilty deserve
to be punished.72 Under this view, the criminal justice system, from the
police to the courts to the prisons, is designed to ensure that this policy
goal is achieved. The guilty should be punished and the more guilty
should be punished even more. There is an a priori good created by such
punishments that extends beyond any contingent instrumental benefits
that the punishments might have. Although some deterrent or other
consequentialist eﬀects might ensue, the real justification for the project
comes from the inherent moral worth of punishing those who deserve to
be punished.73 To do so helps to vindicate the Right over the Wrong (to
borrow the Germanic phrase).
In particular, punishments for genocide and crimes against humanity
fit this profile. Genocide in particular is the ultimate crime because
it involves the destruction not just of one individual but of an entire
people.74 Those individuals who plan, participate or otherwise organise
…if these scholarly accounts have had any impact on judges. The impact is diﬃcult to measure
for two reasons. First, judges frequently oﬀer li le substantive argumentation to justify their
sentences. Second, judges at the international tribunals rarely cite scholarly materials in their
judgements, preferring instead to rely on case law, both from the tribunals themselves and,
where necessary, from war crimes tribunals dating back to World War II.
71
Drumbl argues that retributivism is the main sentencing theory dominating the tribunals at
this time, though his reasons for this conclusion are unclear. See Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence
and Individual Punishment’, supra note 54, at 560-61. My reading of the sentencing judgements
suggests that while Nuremberg was dominated by retributive policies, the current tribunals
in their practice, as opposed to their rhetoric, are more motivated by concerns of deterrence
and rehabilitation imported from the domestic penal sphere. This is the only way to explain
the lower sentences at the ICTY.
72
For an expression of the principle, see G.P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000 [1978]) 459-63 (linking retribution, desert, and culpability).
73
See ibid., at 462 (maximum level of punishment is set by the degree of wrongdoing).
74
Although academic debates continue about the appropriate list of protected groups under
the Genocide Convention, the originator of the concept, Raphael Lemkin, envisioned genocide
as the eradication of a human genos, a national group. See R. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied
Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government and Proposals for Redress (Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944). The moral gravity of the crime stems
not from the murder of a large number of individuals (covered by war crimes and crimes
against humanity), but the distinct harm of cultural eradication, thus suggesting that
Continued
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genocidal campaigns are singled out in our justice system for particular
disapprobation. Such individuals deserve to be severely punished for their
outrageous conduct, because to do otherwise would be to allow them to
escape responsibility for their crimes, resulting in impunity – the chief
enemy of international criminal justice. In the case of genocide, it may not
ma er that neither rehabilitation nor deterrence apply as rationales for
its punishment. Indeed, if there is any area of the law where retributive
sentiments are justified, it is in the context of genocide and crimes against
humanity, where the damage to the moral fabric of society is so severe that
the international justice system goes to extreme lengths – harnessing the
powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – to
see that the guilty are punished.75 Such a hĳacking of the international
system is warranted not just by instrumental values (seeing that particular
individuals are rehabilitated), but also by a priori goals, including the
punishment of the guilty just because those who are guilty of genocide
deserve to be punished.
There is always a diﬃculty in explaining retributive sentiments to those
who do not share them.76 Indeed, criminal law theorists working within
the retributive paradigm o en have li le to say to defend their worldview.
Such conversations invariably return to the foundational statement that the
guilty deserve their punishment, and that escaping one’s just deserts is a
moral wrong. Although such statements are posited, there is li le that can
be oﬀered in the way of justifying this worldview to a consequentialist more
concerned with deterrence or rehabilitation. Nonetheless, it is important
not to place the burden of such a defence squarely on the shoulders of the
retributivist. The burden must also fall on the consequentialist to explain
why punishing the guilty is important in cases of genocide and crimes
against humanity when the usual consequentialist goals – deterrence and
rehabilitation – are at best diﬃcult to implement and at worst irrelevant.
Why then punish the genocidaires at all?
One might object that this entire discussion is not an appropriate subject
ma er for international criminal lawyers, who are accustomed to dealing
with legal doctrine, not abstract moral philosophy underlying the institution
…those who carry out these crimes deserve special punishment. For a discussion of genos as
opposed to ethnos as the root of the concept, see W.A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law:
The Crime of Crimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 25.
75
For an analysis of this phenomenon, see G.P. Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, ‘The ICC – Two Courts
in One,’ (2006) 4 JICJ 428.
76
Cf. W.A. Schabas, ‘Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach,’
(1997) 7 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 461, at 502 (‘At best, the retributive
sentiments of victims and their families, and of the public in general, must be taken into
account in developing appropriate policies to deal with punishment for gross human rights
abuses. But their encouragement may have unwanted and unhappy side eﬀects, particularly
where society is concerned with rebuilding and reconciliation. It should not be forgo en
that many of the most appalling crimes in both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were
commi ed in the name of retribution for past grievances.’).
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of punishment. This may be true, certainly now that international criminal
justice has flourished into an autonomous legal field, complete with
legal rules that have their own status independent of the preexisting
moral codes from which they initially derived both their inspiration and
legitimacy. Now such international legal rules have their own status, with
an institutional background, complete with professional lawyers trained
in their interpretation and manipulation through skilled advocacy. This
objection may be true, and if it is, it indicates an appropriate role for scholars
of international criminal justice, schooled in the philosophical foundations
of international criminal justice, in much the same way that domestic
criminal law is dominated not just by practitioners and scholars but also
by philosophers of criminal law dedicated to solving such foundational
puzzles.
This is by far the most important conceptual puzzle for international
criminal justice. Given that the usual consequentialist rationales for
punishment do not apply with enough force in cases of genocide and
crimes against humanity, the choice is either to recognise the uniquely
retributive goal of these prosecutions or to simply let the criminals go free.
The la er, of course, is not an option. Within this retributive framework,
however, more work remains to be done. International criminal law must
establish a coherent theory of punishment applicable to its context. I will
oﬀer in the remaining pages of this section a brief outline of what such
a theory would look like, though a complete defence cannot be oﬀered
here. The details of the account must be le as a future research project to
be given top priority.
When properly understood, punishment in international criminal law is
at once retributivist and consequentialist, but at two diﬀerent levels. In
addition to the basic fact that the guilty deserve to be punished, the victims
of various conflicts – say the Kurds in Iraq, the Kosovars in Yugoslavia,
the Tutsi in Rwanda – may feel that the guilty deserve to be punished. I am
making a distinction here between the actual retributive foundations for
international criminal justice on the one hand, and the retributive beliefs
that victim groups may hold. Such groups are usually not concerned either
with deterrence or with rehabilitation. Their sole concern is to achieve
justice for the wrongs that were commi ed against their children, their
parents, or their spouses. In this sense the victims are frequently motivated
by retributivist sentiments.77
However, if the victims feel as if the perpetrators will not get the punishment
that they deserve – because they will not be caught, because there are no
77

Some victims may be influenced by deterrence in the sense that they yearn for a politically
stable security situation and an end to bloodshed. To the extent that they believe that a tribunal
might positively influence such an outcome, they may be inclined to view a tribunal’s work
through that lens. Although no empirical data is available, I submit that this is the minority
view among victims.
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tribunals within which to try them, or because the sentences will be too
low78 – then the victims may decide to engage in self-help measures and
take ma ers into their own hands. This is where the consequentialist
rationale for international criminal punishment does come into play, but
it is entirely diﬀerent from the usual goals as typically understood in
domestic criminal law. In this sense, the point of international criminal
tribunals is, in many cases, to convince victims to put down their arms
and forgo reprisal a acks, and to submit their grievances to the rule of
law. This dynamic is central to international criminal justice, especially
since both the creation of the ICTY and the ICTR, as well as binding ICC
referrals from the Security Council, are based on the Security Council’s
Chapter VII authority to take measures to restore international peace and
security. In this manner, then, criminal law intersects with international
law, insofar as the criminal justice system for individuals is used as a way
to help promote international peace and collective security.79
However, even with this context of international peace and security, it
is critically important to remember that at the level of the victims, the
justification is retributive. International peace and security can only be
achieved if the victims believe that the inherent retributive goals of the
criminal process are being fulfilled. If they lose confidence in the system,
the process collapses and the ultimate goals of international security are
threatened as well, because the warring factions will continue to fight.
This is especially true in cases where a victim group does not have the
ability to respond with military force at the moment of its slaughter, but
may postpone reprisals for years – decades even – until their military or
political strength is greater. It is in this way that past wrongs fester until
they infect future generations as well.80
It is somewhat ironic, then, that international law must recognise the
basic, foundational elements of retributivism in the criminal process, if
the non-retributive goals of public international law are to be achieved. If
the retributive goals are ignored, victims lose confidence in the system, the
guilty are not adequately punished, the moral fabric to the international
community is not repaired, ethnic conflict reignites, and the twin goals
of collective peace and security, as codified in the UN Charter, are not
respected. This is what I meant when I argued initially that international
criminal law must develop a unique theory of punishment.
One might object that this account places too much emphasis on the
demands of the victims. Victims might demand all sorts of remedial
78

See Combs, ‘International Decisions’, supra note 69, at 936 (victims reacted with ‘predictable
outrage’ to Plavšić sentence).
79
For a full description of this theory, see J.D. Ohlin, ‘On the Very Idea of Transitional Justice’,
(2007) 8 Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 51.
80
See Combs, ‘International Decisions’, supra note 69, at 937 (noting the possibility of bi erness
generated by international criminal trials).
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measures in response to their suﬀering, some of which may be warranted,
but others which may not be warranted. In any event, whether such
responses are warranted must be established independently, as it were, in
the sense that it is not because the victims have demanded it that we institute
such measures. Otherwise the argument would prove too much, because
anything the victims demand would have to become policy.
This objection misunderstands the structure of the unique theory. At the
most foundational level, the warrant for punishing international crimes
is retributivist – the perpetrators deserve to be punished. Switching our
gaze to the collective level – the world of nation-states, international law,
and peace and security – helps us to understand the consequences of not
recognising the true and ineluctable retributive nature of the criminal
process. At the level of international law, the endeavour of international
criminal justice is justified by consequentialist commitments. But at the
level of criminal law, the practice of punishment is justified by retributivist
commitments. Like a Rorschach test, one can look at diﬀerent levels when
one considers international criminal justice and see diﬀerent things.
When one evaluates the practice of institutions, one considers the fate of
collectives and the consequentialist goals of peace and security take centre
focus, but when one evaluates the sentences of particular individuals,
then one focuses more tightly on retributive concerns: the oﬀender, his
crime, and the moral gravity of the oﬀence. It should be no surprise that
international criminal law involves a combination of both, depending on
which level one examines, since the field itself involves the intersection of
international law and criminal law norms. International criminal justice is
the intersection of these two fields, and its sentencing philosophy ought
to account for this.
V.

PROCEDURAL CHANGES

Having identified the contours of a unique theory of international criminal
sentencing – retributive at the individual level, consequentialist at the
level of international law – it now remains to chart the procedural changes
required to bring this vision to fruition. Although there may be more, there
are at least three considerations: (1) the return of a distinct sentencing phase
a er trial; (2) the creation of a sentencing commission to guide judges in
exercising their discretion; and (3) the dra ing of international sentencing
guidelines by the commission. These procedural changes will promote
the institutional development of a sui generis system of international
sentencing.
1.

Require a distinct sentencing phase

The most important procedural change required is the establishment
of a distinct sentencing phase during the trial process. The ICTY flirted
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with a separate sentencing phase in its infancy,81 though it abandoned the
procedure for less than fully articulated reasons.82 For example, Tadić and
Erdemović were both sentenced in distinct sentencing phases. However,
the ICTY changed this procedure in 1998 with the amendment of Rules 85
and 8783 in an eﬀort to increase eﬃciency. Scholars have generally assumed
that the rationale was motivated by a desire to decrease the overall length
of proceedings and avoid reduplication of evidence and testimony.84
However, it is uncertain if the elimination of the sentencing phase has been
successful against this barometer. For example, character witnesses and
other evidence only relevant to sentencing must now be presented during
the consolidated trial phase, thus prolonging the time required to return
a verdict on guilt.85 This suggests that the preferred procedure, even on
eﬃciency grounds, is bifurcation.86
Scholars have generally noted that the ICC will return to the practice of
a separate sentencing phase.87 This decision was required, in part, by the
growing complexity of sentencing under the Rome Statute, which allows for
victim participation under Rules 89 and 91 and consideration of reparations
under Rule 94. Furthermore, the factors that determine sentencing under
Rule 145, including mitigating and aggravating circumstances, are
substantial, and arguably cannot be eﬃciently evaluated within the same
81
See ICTY Bulletin No. 12, The Penalties at the ICTY: Determination and Enforcement (‘Unlike
the Nuremberg trials, where sentences were handed down concurrently with the verdicts,
the RPE envisage sentencing as a distinct phase. This is particularly indicated by Rule 100’).
Rule 100 (which remains in eﬀect) allows the Prosecutor and Defence, a er conviction on a
guilty plea, to submit information to the court relevant to sentencing.
82
See Sloane, ‘Sentencing for the “Crime of Crimes”‘, supra note 6, at 734; W.A. Logan,
‘Confronting Evil: Victims’ Rights in an Age of Terror’, (2008) 96 Georgetown Law Journal 721,
at 773; S.D. Murphy, ‘Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia’, (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 57, at 92 (discussing
ICTY decision to eliminate sentencing phases).
83
See Murphy, ‘Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia’, supra note 82, at 92. Rule 85 (A) (vi) states that evidence at trial shall
include ‘any relevant information that may assist the Trial Chamber in determining an
appropriate sentence if the accused is found guilty on one or more of the charges in the
indictment.’ Rule 87 (C) states that ‘If the Trial Chamber finds the accused guilty on one or
more charges contained in the indictment, it shall impose a sentence in respect of each finding
of guilt and indicate whether such sentences shall be served consecutively or concurrently,
unless it decides to exercise its power to impose a single sentence reflecting the totality of
the criminal conduct of the accused.’
84
See A.N. Keller, ‘Punishment for Violations of International Criminal Law: An Analysis of
Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR’, (2001) 12 Indiana International & Comparative Law Review 53,
at 68; M.A. Drumbl and K.S. Gallant, ‘Sentencing Policies and Practices in the International
Criminal Tribunals’, (2003) 15 Federal Sentencing Reporter 140, at 142.
85
On this point, see S. Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2003) 198.
86
Cf. C. Saﬀerling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2001) 376.
87
See ICC Rule 143. Cf. Logan, ‘Confronting Evil’, supra note 82, at 773 (citing G.A. Knoops, An
Introduction to the Law of International Criminal Tribunals: A Comparative Study (2003) 117).
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trial proceeding as the guilt phase. However, the exact contours of future
ICC sentencing procedure are unknown.88
The ICC framework is echoed by substantial scholarly support for the
bifurcation of sentencing from the guilt phase.89 Scholars have noted
multiple rationales for bifurcation, but by far the most important is the
fairness associated with allowing a defendant to oﬀer mitigating evidence
– including remorse – without the risk of compromising an assertion of
innocence.90 In a consolidated proceeding, defendants as a practical ma er
are precluded from expressing remorse for a crime that they claim not
to have commi ed, for the simple reason that one cannot have personal
remorse for actions one has not commi ed.91 In a similar vain, defendants
may wish to call diﬀerent witnesses during a sentencing phase whose
testimony might be adverse to their interests during the guilt phase of the
trial.92 Therefore, consolidated proceedings are not only not justified by
eﬃciency grounds, they are also supported by a human rights oriented
approach to criminal procedure.93
There is an intuitive connection between this point and the desire to
encourage detailed deliberation by the court on sentencing ma ers. If
litigants are given the opportunity to present arguments specifically
tailored to the question of sentencing, the court will be more likely to
respond with a decision that not only carefully considers those arguments,
but also presents a coherent vision and detailed rationale for the handing
down of a specific sentence.94 Ideally, such decisions will be closely tailored
88

Compare Drumbl and Gallant, ‘Sentencing Policies and Practices in the International
Criminal Tribunals’, supra note 84, at 142 (‘The Rome State of the ICC, on the other hand,
appears to favor a separate sentencing hearing’) and Saﬀerling, Towards an International
Criminal Procedure, supra note 86, 315 (Article 76 contemplates separate sentencing phase)
with Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings, supra note 85, 198 (‘The
system as defined by this amendment has also been adopted as a model for the ICC Statute’
and noting that sentencing evidence is presented prior to determination of guilt).
89
See Logan, ‘Confronting Evil’, supra note 82, at 773.
90
Ibid.; R. Henham, Punishment and Process in International Criminal Trials (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2005) 61. For an example, see Judgement, Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, T. Ch.
II, ICTY, 27 September 2007, para. 699.
91
This argument was considered and rejected by the ICTY in Judgement, Prosecutor v. Brdjanin,
Case No. IT-99-36-T, T. Ch. II, ICTY, 1 September 2004, para. 1077-81. See also Judgement,
Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, A. Ch., ICTY, 25 February 2004, para. 177 (‘The
Appeals Chamber is of the view that an accused can express sincere regrets without admi ing
his participation in a crime, and that that is a factor which may be taken into account.’). The
Appeals Chamber did not explain how this would be possible. See W.A. Schabas, The UN
International Criminal Tribunals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 429.
92
See Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings, supra note 85, 198.
93
Ibid., at 198-9 (noting that the human rights view is supported by ICTY Rule 6 which prevents
trial phase consolidation in cases pending at the time of the amendment so as not to ‘prejudice
the rights of the accused’). Zappalà correctly concludes that the rule concedes that the change
reduces the level of procedural protections oﬀered to the defense. Ibid., at 199.
94
Logan, ‘Confronting Evil’, supra note 82, at 773, footnote 366. This would point the way
towards what Sloane refers to as a mature jurisprudence of sentencing. See Sloane, ‘Sentencing
for the “Crime of Crimes”‘, supra note 6, at 734.
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to the unique circumstances of international criminal justice, rather than
simply copied from the domestic sphere.95
Commentators have already noted the degree to which sentencing appears
to be an a erthought, and that the judges at the ICTY and ICTR do li le
more than list the permissible aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
recite the facts of the case, and then impose a length of imprisonment.96 In
the words of one scholar, there appears to be li le concern with ‘grounding
the ad hoc tribunals’ sentences, including the prohibition on the death
penalty, in a coherent moral or philosophical framework.’97
Requiring a distinct sentencing phase would encourage international
judges to make explicit the legal and factual findings that support their
decisions, as well as engage in the moral and legal reasoning about
the defendant’s culpability and the necessary sentence to match that
culpability.98 These sentencing phases should be conducted in accordance
with appropriate procedural mechanisms to allow for the new evidence not
introduced during the guilt phases of the trial, including so-called ‘victim
impact’ testimony from the prosecution,99 as well as defence evidence of
mitigating circumstances that aﬀect the defendant’s individual culpability.
Separating such evidence from the guilt phase of the trial will not only
improve sentencing decisions but will also clarify the goals of the guilt
phase of the trial and remove evidence from that phase that has no direct
bearing on the defendant’s guilt or innocence as to the specific factual
allegations against him. Arguably, character witnesses called during the
guilt phase (whether by the prosecution or defence) will oﬀer testimony
that is highly prejudicial as to the defendant’s guilt and furthermore will
only be probative as to sentencing.
95

Indeed, the Trial Chamber in Delalić started its analysis by referring to Article 33 of the SFRY
Penal Code. See Judgement, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21, T. Ch. II, ICTY, 16
November 1998, para. 1230. The support for this reliance comes from ICTY Statute Article 24
(1) and has baﬄed some scholars. See Saﬀerling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure,
supra note 86 at 315. However, this application of Article 24 (1) is perhaps required by the
principle of legality, such that defendants at the ICTY are not subject to greater penalties
than they would have endured under preexisting domestic law in Yugoslavia. See Secretary
General’s Report to the Security Council, S/25074, 3 May 1993; Zappalà, Human Rights in
International Criminal Proceedings, supra note 85, 196; G. Me raux, International Crimes and the
Ad Hoc Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 344. One unfortunate consequence
of this reliance is that it impedes development of a sui generis sentencing jurisprudence.
96
See Sloane, ‘Sentencing for the “Crime of Crimes”‘, supra note 6, at 713.
97
See Alvarez, ‘Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda’, supra note 39, at
409.
98
Sentencing phases are also supported by Harman and Gaynor, ‘Ordinary Sentences for
Extraordinary Crimes’, supra note 2, at 683, who argue for longer sentences at the ICTY.
However, Harman and Gaynor argue, contrary to my position, that tribunals should give
greater weight to deterrence. As should already be abundantly clear, a misplaced commitment
to both deterrence and rehabilitation is the source of the problem – not the solution. The
only solution is to recognise the true retributive nature of international criminal justice, and
encourage sentences which adequately represent the moral desert of the oﬀenders.
99
On the proper role of victims in the criminal process, see G.P. Fletcher, With Justice For Some:
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2.

An International Sentencing Commission

The second suggested procedural reform is the creation of an International
Sentencing Commission. Judges currently exercise ad hoc discretion in
making sentencing determinations, with the result that there is li le
consistency between sentences at the ICTY. At the ICC, Rule 145 of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence calls for the penalty to reflect ‘the culpability of
the convicted person’ by balancing all relevant factors, including mitigating
and aggravating factors, as well as the extent of the damage caused, the
harm to the victims, the nature of the unlawful behaviour, the means used
to execute the crime, the degree of participation, as well as other factors.
Rule 145 also specifically mentions that aggravating factors include, inter
alia, abuse of power, acts of cruelty and acts against multiple victims,
whether the victims were defenceless, and motives of discrimination. It
is telling, though, that the provision on fines – Rule 146 – is longer than
Rule 145 on the determination of sentences.
The Rome Statute currently includes a wide variety of procedures
governing the sentencing of individuals, the transfer of individuals to
custodial states to serve their term of imprisonment, who shall bear the
cost, when a sentence can be reviewed (Article 110), how to determine the
location of the prison sentence, the right of states enforcing a sentence to
place some restrictions on how the sentence is imposed, but restricting these
states from reducing or lengthening the sentence. The procedures in this
regard are already robust and well defined, except in the area that is most
important: what the appropriate penalties should be for particular crimes.
Every scholar has a basic idea that proportionality is a laudable goal,100 but
there is nothing in either the Rome Statute itself or the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence to guide judges in making sentencing determinations for
crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity.101
An International Sentencing Commission would perform a valuable
pedagogical function by educating judges and fostering dialogue
among international criminal lawyers from all sides of the proceedings.
Independent staﬀ would conduct both empirical and theoretical research
regarding international sentencing. Judges would become more aware
of the unique challenges involved in sentencing for international crimes.
Moreover, they might genuinely value and trust the counsel they receive
from independent experts whose analysis is more independent than what
judges hear in court from defence a orneys and prosecutors. The most
important goal of this pedagogical process would be to encourage judges
to consider the sentencing process carefully and produce sophisticated
Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials (New York: Addison Wesley, 1995).
100
See, e.g., Saﬀerling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure, supra note 86, 314.
101
See Sloane, ‘Sentencing for the “Crime of Crimes”‘, supra note 6, at 89 (rejecting ‘rigid’
guidelines similar to the US federal Sentencing Reform Act but proposing a rational and
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sentencing decisions that articulate in detail the legal basis for each
particular sentence handed down.
3.

International sentencing guidelines

An International Sentencing Commission would fill this gap by establishing
general guidelines, in much the same way that the US Sentencing Guidelines
aid the sentencing process in the federal courts.102 These guidelines were
once mandatory, but are now advisory a er the US Supreme Court ruled
that they infringed the basic constitutional right to a jury trial because the
guidelines relied on factual determinations made by a judge, instead of a
jury.103 The guidelines created by an International Sentencing Commission
would take as their starting point the factors identified by Rule 145 of the
Rules of Procedure, but would render them in greater detail, and include
specific guidelines for each oﬀence.104 The rules would not be mandatory,
but rather persuasive, in that they would establish clearly some basic
principles to guide sentencing, so that each judge was not working from
a blank slate.105 For example, commission guidelines could include a
directive indicating a hierarchy of criminal oﬀences, with genocide at
the top, against which mitigating and aggravating factors would then
be considered. As it stands now, aggravating and mitigating factors are
considered, but they are considered against a blank slate, i.e. there is no
norm against which the aggravating or mitigating factors operate, thus
rendering the factors somewhat meaningless. Indeed, international courts
have explicitly refrained from establishing a hierarchy of international
crimes.106 The creation of sentencing guidelines, and the work of the
sentencing commission in general, might force international judges to
flexible scheme to convey aggravating and mitigating factors).
102
For a discussion generally of the value of sentencing guidelines, see A. von Hirsch et al.,
The Sentencing Commission and its Guidelines (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1987)
11; J.C. Coﬀee, Jr. and M. Tonry, ‘Hard Choices: Critical Trade-Oﬀs in the Implementation
of Sentencing Reform through Guidelines’, in M. Tonry and F.E. Zimring (eds.), Reform and
Punishment, supra note 20, at 155. Compare with M. Tonry, Sentencing Ma ers (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996) 85-89 (discussing shortcomings of guidelines).
103
See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005).
104
The suggestion has been made by others as well. See, e.g., A. Dubinsky, Note, ‘An
Examination of International Sentencing Guidelines and a Proposal for Amendments to
the International Criminal Court’s Sentencing Structure’, (2007) 33 New England Journal on
Criminal & Civil Confinement 609, at 635-6.
105
By making the guidelines optional, they would avoid the problems of inflexibility that
plagued the US sentencing guidelines. However, they would only be useful insofar as they
were considered persuasive authority by justices at the court and the degree to which they
were actually consulted by judges when they rendered their sentencing judgements. There
is reason to think that judges would both consult and cite them, since there is so li le legal
guidance that the judges may currently make reference to when explaining their decisions
about prison terms.
106
See, e.g., Judgement, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23, T. Ch. I, ICTY, 22 February
2001, para. 851; Drumbl and Gallant, ‘Sentencing Policies and Practices in the International
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confront a diﬃcult theoretical question that they might otherwise prefer
to ignore.
4.

Eﬀects of the procedural changes

In order for the sentencing procedures of international criminal justice to
develop fully, a greater sensitivity to questions of proportionality must be
encouraged. The aforementioned International Sentencing Commission
is one way of encouraging this goal, in that the guidelines produced by
the Commission would help ensure consistency across defendants and
across courtrooms.
However, it is important not to enshrine a fallacious sense of proportionality.
There is some temptation to use proportionality as an argument for
leniency.107 Here is how the argument is usually developed. First, one
defendant receives a life sentence for organising genocide or promoting
crimes against humanity. Arguably, the first defendant is the worst sort of
criminal the system will deal with. Then, a second defendant successfully
argues that he is less culpable than the first defendant, and therefore also
argues that proportionality requires that he receive a lower sentence.108
Finally, a third defendant makes the same argument, as do others, with the
result that many defendants receive sentences that are scaled down – all
in the name of proportionality, to such a degree that one wonders whether
the less culpable defendants are receiving appropriate sentences.109
It is important in this regard to distinguish between defendant-relative
proportionality and oﬀence-gravity proportionality.110 The first concept
Criminal Tribunals’, supra note 84, at 142-3.
107
For example, a er Nuremberg, US High Commissioner John J. McCloy was concerned that
Krupp’s treatment was out of line with the sentences received by other industrialists, who
were given light sentences or acqui ed in the Flick trial. This led to a series of commutations
by McCloy and the Peck Commission.
108
See, e.g., Appellant Hassan Ngeze’s Request for the Appeal Chamber to take Appropriate
Steps to Rectify the Diﬀerential and Unequal Treatment Between the ICTR and ICTY in
Sentencing Policies and Other Rights, Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A,
28 November 2005, para. 22.
109
Judges in the other industrialist trials a er Flick relied on the leniency of these decisions
as a rationale for extending the lenient treatment, arguing, in part, that stiﬀ sentences would
violate proportionality among the various ‘white collar’ defendants. An initial expression
of leniency against a small group of industrialists gave birth to continuing pressure for
leniency against all accused industrialists, based largely on the theory that the most culpable
defendants (the direct perpetrators) ought to receive the severest penalties, while the least
culpable defendants (those who merely aided or abe ed the genocide) ought to receive lighter
penalties. In a more recent example, this argument was made by the defence but rejected by
the ICTR in Decision on Hassan Ngeze’s Motion Requesting to Rectify the Diﬀerential and
Unequal Treatment Between the ICTR and ICTY in Sentencing Policies and Other Rights,
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, A. Ch., 23 February 2006.
110
This distinction is analogous to one drawn by A. von Hirsh in ‘Criminology:
Commensurability and Crime Prevention: Evaluating Formal Sentencing Structures and Their
Rationale’, (1983) 74 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 209, at 212 (defining
Continued
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requires that defendants receive sentences that are proportional to other
defendants who are more or less culpable, such that the worst defendants
get the highest sentences and the least culpable defendants get the lowest
sentences.111 Given that there is a limit to the maximum sentence – life
in prison – defendant-relative proportionality can only be achieved by
reducing the sentences of the other defendants.
However, this strategy may pose problems for the second concept, oﬀencegravity proportionality. This second concept requires that the punishment
be proportional – i.e. reflect the gravity of the oﬀence – which means that
even lower-level defendants convicted of serious crimes such as genocide
may deserve the highest sentences that the system can oﬀer, i.e. life in
prison. In these cases, defendant-relative proportionality and oﬀencegravity proportionality are actually at cross purposes, in that fidelity to
defendant-relative proportionality may lead a court to lower the sentence
of a defendant to such a degree that it violates the intuitive directives
of oﬀence-gravity proportionality. As I shall now discuss, this result is
problematic, especially when considered against the background value
of ending impunity for international crimes.
When the two senses of proportionality are at cross purposes with each
other, it requires that we engage in a preliminary ranking of the two, so that
we can decide which sense of proportionality ought to be maximised, if
indeed we can only maximise one. I would submit that the retributive aims
of international criminal justice counsel in favour of prioritising oﬀencegravity proportionality, because convicted war criminals will only get the
punishment that they deserve if they are punished according to the gravity
of the oﬀence for which they are convicted. Lowering their sentences in
order to make it proportional with other, more culpable, defendants only
runs the risk that the sentence will not adequately reflect the moral desert of
the oﬀender.112 However, I concede that I cannot oﬀer a full-blown defence
of this prioritisation of the two concepts within the confines of this chapter.
The subject will have to be explored in greater depth in another forum.
However, it is clear that these two aspects of proportionality are in severe
tension in international criminal justice.
This intuitive dilemma, internal to the notion of proportionality itself,
is rarely recognised by international judges. It is imperative that future
…parity, cardinal proportionality and ordinal proportionality as three requirements of desert
commensurability). See also A. von Hirsch, ‘Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment’,
(1992) 16 Crime & Justice 55, at 75. However, the terms are not without their critics. See, e.g.,
J. Davis, ‘The Science of Sentencing: Measurement Theory and von Hirsch’s New Scales of
Justice,’ in Tata and Hu on (eds.), Sentencing and Society, supra note 9, at 338.
111
Von Hirsch refers to this as ordinal proportionality. See Von Hirsch, ‘Proportionality in
the Philosophy of Punishment’, supra note 110, at 77.
112
It may not be clear to all that this is the right question. For a defence of desert as the primary
consideration for the punishment of international crimes, see supra section IV.
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sentencing judges not only appreciate this theoretical tension, but hand
down sentences that are consistent with an understanding of both senses
of proportionality. The creation of a sentencing commission, sentencing
guidelines, and a separate sentencing phase will hopefully encourage
judges to confront and resolve these issues more directly. Arguably,
when one sense of proportionality must yield to the other, judges must
understand that first and foremost, their duty is to hand down sentences
that adequately reflect the true gravity of the oﬀence charged.113 In this
sense, the sentencing commission could be of invaluable guidance,
because it could establish a hierarchy between diﬀerent oﬀences and the
circumstances that might aggravate and mitigate such conduct,114 while at
the same time establish sentences that depart from the goal of defendantrelative proportionality when the case in question requires this result
(because of the demands of oﬀence-gravity proportionality).
One source for the tension between these two senses of proportionality
stems from the fact that the worst oﬀenders cannot be executed under
current guidelines of international criminal justice. As I have argued
elsewhere, it is an exaggeration to claim that applying the death penalty
for crimes of genocide violates international law as such.115 Although
European states have ratified the optional protocols abolishing the death
penalty in all circumstances, including for grave crimes in times of war
and emergency, it would be incorrect to say that customary international
law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for crimes against
humanity and genocide.116 Rather, the brief history of international criminal
justice indicates that many trials, both international and domestic, have
proceeded under rules that allowed the death penalty, including the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the subsequent US Military
Trials at Nuremberg, the Far East Tribunal, as well as national courts trying
Eichmann and Saddam Hussein.117
113

This duty is arguably codified in Rule 145 (1) (a) of the ICC RPE that calls for sentences
that reflect ‘the culpability of the convicted person.’ It is interesting to note that the rule does
not state that punishment cannot exceed the culpability of the oﬀender, but rather implies that
the punishment must equal the culpability of the oﬀender, which suggests that the norm may
be violated by sentences that are too low (in addition to those that are too high). Also, Article
77 of the Rome Statute allows for life sentences only upon a finding that such a sentence is
required by the ‘extreme gravity of the crime’, though the provision does not require a life
sentence for any crime.
114
Compare with Judgement, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23, T. Ch. I, ICTY,
22 February 2001, para. 851.
115
For a full analysis, see Ohlin, ‘Applying the Death Penalty for Crimes of Genocide’, supra
note 32, at 747 (arguing that the emerging customary norm prohibiting the death penalty
does not apply in cases of genocide).
116
See ibid., at 752-53 (discussing insuﬃcient state practice for formation of customary
norm).
117
Some recent national prosecutions for genocidal acts have proceeded without the death
penalty. See, e.g., Niyonteze v. Public Prosecutor, Trib. militaire de cassation, 27 April 2001,
available at h p://www.vbs.admin.ch/internet/OA/d/urteile.htm (Swiss court exercising
Continued
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Of course, the parties to the Rome Statute will not amend the rules of the
court to allow for executions, even for cases dealing with a modern-day
Hitler, because the penalty contravenes human rights norms that are wellentrenched in Europe and elsewhere.118 The question of abolition within
the context of the law of war cannot be separated from the politics and
human rights discourse associated with abolition in domestic criminal law,
where outrageous conduct still dominates capital prosecutions in places
like China and Iran.119 There are at least three distinct consequences of
international criminal justice’s abolitionism.
First, judges should be sensitive to the problems of proportionality created
by the lack of the death penalty as an available option at international
tribunals, and that even the highest sentence – life in prison – may be
inadequate to represent the moral gravity of some oﬀences, especially
in cases dealing with the highest perpetrators for crimes of genocide
and crimes against humanity. This is relevant when it comes time to
sentence lower-rung defendants and to decide whether these defendants
should receive correspondingly lower punishments.120 In making such
determinations, judges use the previous sentences for other perpetrators
as the baseline for making these relative comparisons.121 If, however, the
sentences for the most culpable perpetrators do not adequately match
the moral gravity of the oﬀence (because human rights standards do
not allow us to impose such punishments), then perhaps these original
sentences are inappropriate as starting benchmarks from which to make
such comparisons.
Second, judges must be aware that the abolitionist structure of international
criminal justice is not representative of non-European penal systems,
…universal jurisdiction in case against former mayor accused of ordering massacre of Tutsi
and moderate Hutu. The case is discussed in Luc Reydams, ‘Case Report: Niyonteze v. Public
Prosecutor’, (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 231. Also, the Canadian government
prosecuted Desire Munyaneza, a Rwandan Hutu living in Canada, for genocide. However,
examples of national prosecutions for genocide resulting in death sentences include Saddam
Hussein in Iraq and the Rwandan execution of criminals implicated in the genocide there.
For a description of the la er, see J.C. McKinley Jr., ‘As Crowds Vent Their Rage, Rwanda
Publicly Executes 22,’ The New York Times, 25 April 1998, at A1.
118
For a discussion of the political issues in this area, see Ohlin, ‘Applying the Death Penalty
for Crimes of Genocide’, supra note 32, at 754 (noting that the Security Council’s decision
to forgo the death penalty for the ICTY and ICTR was motivated, inter alia, by political
considerations regarding domestic abolitionism).
119
See, e.g., ‘China,’ in Amnesty International, Report 2003, available at h p://web.amnesty.
org/report2003/indexeng (documenting at least 1921 death sentences and 1060 executions
in 2002, though estimating that the true number may be higher).
120
Cf. Judgement, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23, T. Ch., ICTY, 22 February
2001, para. 859 (where the court recognised that the defendant would have been subject to the
death penalty under the SFRY Criminal Code given the severity of the oﬀences). However,
in other cases the reference has had the opposite eﬀect. See Judgement, Prosecutor v. Mrkšić,
Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, T. Ch. II, ICTY, 27 September 2007, para. 708 (referring to Serbian
prosecutions in which an appeal reduced an eight-year sentence to two years).
121
See, e.g., Judgement, Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1, T. Ch., ICTY, 2 November
2001, para. 732.
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many of which still include the death penalty, especially in some African
countries, the United States, Russia,122 China, Iran, the Middle East, and
some Caribbean countries.123 This was of particular concern a er the
Rwandan genocide, when the Rwandan representative to the United
Nations, Manzi Bakuramutsa, complained bi erly about the lack of the
death penalty at the proposed ICTR, and on that basis voted against
the Security Council resolution creating the Tribunal.124 Many of the
geographical localities where international criminal law is likely to be active
– war-torn areas of the globe – may be those where the death penalty is
still an active part of the domestic penal system.125 Insofar as international
criminal law hopes to be truly international in scope, international courts
should be cognisant of the fact that, at the moment, sentencing policies do
not represent the sentencing philosophy of a good portion of the world.126
In order to maintain consensus, the field has ‘defined sentences down’ to
the lowest common denominator that all participants are comfortable with.
In situations where the victims come from these non-abolitionist countries,
judges must remain particularly sensitive to this complex dynamic.
Third, both judges and scholars must pay particular a ention to the
potentially negative incentives created by the current sentencing policies.
As has been noted before, defendants tried in domestic courts may face
penalties, including death sentences, which far outstrip the sentences
handed down at international tribunals.127 This is especially problematic
given the tendency in international criminal justice to try the most culpable
defendants in an international forum, while leaving lower level participants
for local courts. This creates the unfortunate result that the lowest level
participants may face the death penalty for their criminal conduct, while
the worst oﬀenders, including the architects, may escape this fate if they
122

Russia is a special case because although it retains death penalty legislation, it has not
executed anyone since 1996 in accordance with a moratorium on the application of this penalty
established by Yeltsin to bring Russia into compliance with Council of Europe standards. In
1999, the Constitutional Court also entered a moratorium on the imposition of this penalty
until a nationwide jury system could be established.
123
For a complete list, see Ohlin, ‘Applying the Death Penalty for Crimes of Genocide’, supra
note 32, at 750-51.
124
See UN Doc. S/PV.3453, at 14-15 (1994) (‘the establishment of so ineﬀective an international
tribunal would only appease the conscience of the international community rather than
respond to the expectations of the Rwandese people and of the victims of genocide in
particular’).
125
Rwanda abolished the death penalty in 2007. See Organic Law No. 11/2007 of 16 March
2007 Concerning Transfer of Cases to the Republic of Rwanda from the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda and from Other States and Organic Law No 31/2007 of 25 July 2007
Regarding the Abolition of the Death Penalty.
126
Cf. Alvarez, ‘Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda’, supra note 39, at
408, footnote 215.
127
For a discussion of this problem, see ibid., at 407 (‘For Rwandan survivors of the 1994
genocide there is considerable hypocrisy in the United Nations’ insistence that those
defendants lucky enough to face trial at the ICTR will not face the kinds of penalties, including
death, imposed under Rwandan law, even if they were the foremost leaders of genocide.’).
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are transferred to Arusha or The Hague. This dynamic, noted before
by scholars, will get even worse now that the ad hoc tribunals are being
replaced by a permanent court operating under rules of complementary
jurisdiction.128
VI.

CONCLUSION

Establishing a coherent theory of international criminal sentencing is of
more than just philosophical interest. Establishing a coherent account of
why we punish international war criminals will help determine numerous
practical areas of international criminal law, several of which have been
outlined in this essay. There may be more. However, at the least, a coherent
theory of sentencing will impact not just on the length of sentences and
how they are determined, but also the manner in which they are served.
To take just one final example, judges who sentence a criminal before
the International Criminal Court must decide where the criminal should
serve his sentence. According to Chapter 12 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, it is the Presidency that may decide where a defendant is to serve
his prison sentence. Although there is nothing a priori problematic about
such discretion, it is important that whichever organ exercises this function
carefully consider the underlying goals and philosophy of punishment
when making these determinations.
I have, in this chapter, offered an outline of a coherent theory of
international criminal punishment. In short, the usual justifications
for domestic punishment, including rehabilitation and deterrence, are
inapposite, and international sentencing is based on – or ought to be
based on – retributive considerations, as embodied in the Rome Statute’s
plea in its preamble to end impunity for international crimes. Those who
commit these international crimes ought to be punished simply because
of the intrinsic moral worth of these prosecutions: the guilty deserve to be
punished. However, at the level of international law, collective peace and
security demands that we remain faithful to these retributive goals, because
failure to punish the guilty adequately will threaten the very confidence
in the system that allows victims and other groups to forgo reprisals and
submit their grievances to the rule of law and the procedures of criminal
justice – to stay the hand of vengeance, as it were.
The specific procedural proposals discussed in this chapter would help
advance this unique account of international sentencing. Creation of
an international sentencing commission would garner support from all
participants in the system, regardless of political viewpoint. A commission
would create an institution whereby the details of international sentencing
128

On complementarity, see J.T. Holmes, ‘Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC,’
in Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute Commentary, supra note 56, at 667.
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could be further discussed and codified with greater legal clarity and
precision. Participation in this commission should be broad-based,
encompassing every major region (including the United States), include
the work of a wide number of respected scholars and jurists, and provide
a framework for meaningful and incisive debate about sentencing, as
opposed to rehashing the received wisdom on the subject. The goal of
justice itself demands that we give renewed a ention to this most basic
and foundational question about international criminal law.
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